Power: towards a third generation definition by Zaaiman, J.
 Koers 72(3) 2007:357-375  357 
Power: towards a third generation 
definition  
Johan Zaaiman 






Power: towards a third generation definition 
Power is a well-established concept in the social sciences 
especially in the political sciences. Although it is widely used in 
scientific discourse, different definitions and perspectives 
prevail with regard to it. This article aims to explore the possi-
bilities of taking the debate further towards a third generation 
definition of social power. Although first generation definitions 
(associated with Weber and Dahl) and second generation 
definitions (associated with inter alia Giddens and Morriss) are 
still widely used in the academic field, they do not reflect the 
depth of the continuous debate on the concept of power. 
Viewpoints, especially with regard to agency and freedom, are 
not reflected in current definitions. To this can also be added 
the important dynamic relationship between power and change. 
This article summarises the important aspects of power debates 
relevant for defining power and discusses possible ways in 
which this can be accommodated in a definition of power. The 
current debate on the relationship between power and change 
is also reinterpreted with regard to defining social power. The 
article concludes by proposing necessary aspects of a third 
generation definition of power and suggests such a definition.  
Opsomming 
Mag: op weg na ’n derdegenerasiedefinisie  
Mag is ’n goed gevestigde konsep in die sosiale wetenskappe 
veral in die politieke wetenskappe. Hoewel dit algemeen in 
wetenskaplike redevoering gebruik word, bly verskillende defini-
sies en perspektiewe daaroor bestaan. Hierdie artikel onder-
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soek die moontlikhede om die debat verder te neem op weg na 
’n derdegenerasiedefinisie. Hoewel eerstegenerasiedefinisies 
(geassosieer met Weber en Dahl) en tweedegenerasiesdefini-
sies (geassosieer met onder andere Giddens en Morriss) 
steeds algemeen in die akademiese veld gebruik word, reflek-
teer hulle nie die diepte van die volgehoue debat oor die kon-
sep “mag” nie. Gesigspunte, veral ten opsigte van agentskap 
en vryheid, word nie gereflekteer in huidige definisies nie. Hier-
by kan die belangrike dinamiese verhouding tussen mag en 
verandering gevoeg word. Hierdie artikel som die belangrikste 
aspekte van die debatte, wat verband hou met die definiëring 
van “mag”, op en bespreek die verskillende wyses hoe dit in die 
definisie van mag geakkommodeer kan word. Die huidige debat 
oor die verhouding tussen mag en verandering word ook her-
interpreteer met betrekking tot die definiëring van sosiale mag. 
Die artikel sluit af deur die nodige aspekte vir ’n derdegene-
rasiedefinisie van mag voor te stel en dus ’n definisie te sug-
gereer.  
1. Introduction 
The debates with regard to power in the social sciences are 
intensive and widespread. Writers on power differ in their approach 
to this concept. Some writers contribute to our understanding of 
power without embedding themselves in the conceptual debates. 
They use existing or other useful definitions or no definition at all. 
But many writers contribute to the definition debate itself – directly or 
indirectly. A problem in these debates is that many of the contribu-
tions are individualistic and do not necessarily contribute to integrate 
the different views of power. This article does not overcome this 
problem. It is also a very specific view on power referring to various 
contributions to the debate, but proposing a very specific definition.  
2. The first and second generation definitions 
In this article it is proposed that we are moving towards a third 
generation definition of power. The first generation definitions of 
power were the typical early “power over” definitions. Although Max 
Weber doesn’t use the word “over” it is implicated in his definition. 
Weber define power as that chance in a social relationship in which 
somebody can carry out his or her will even against resistance, 
irrespective the basis or the chance (Weber, 1947:152 and Weber 
1962:117). One of the most quoted definitions of power was for-
mulated by Robert Dahl. He described power as follows: “A has 
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power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do.” (Lukes, 1986:2.)1
Raymond Aron, Dennis Wrong and Aovin I. Goldman used the same 
kind of definitions. But their definitions included new elements with 
regard to power. This formed the basis on which eventually the 
second generation of definitions developed. These definitions 
moved away from the view that power is about the impact of A on B, 
to the view that power is a capacity to bring about effects. Aron suc-
cessfully explained that power “... extends over certain men or 
certain groups, and not over others; it exercises command over 
certain kinds of behaviour by the objects of power, but not over 
others” (Aron, 1986:260). Power, therefore can’t be exercised over a 
person but only over a person’s behaviour. In addition Dennis 
Wrong formulated power as the ability of some persons to bring 
about intended and anticipated effects on others (Wrong, 1979:2). 
This established the second generation definitions on power, which 
are described as “power to”. Especially Anthony Giddens (1991) 
settled this notion of power as a capacity by formulating power as an 
agent with the ability to make a difference in the present state of 
affairs.  
In the 1990s the theoretical debates on power developed further 
with the book of Peter Morriss (1987) Power: a philosophical 
analysis playing an important role in it. This lead to second editions 
of Morriss’s book in 2002 and also of Lukes book Power: a radical 
view in 2005. Some of the central issues in these books are those 
that, in my opinion, start to formulate aspects of third generation 
definitions of power.  
But alongside the focused debates on the definition other debates 
on power thrive. Actually, many of the major debates with respect to 
power, in the past and now, are about power-related issues that are 
not directly related to the definition. Typically it is about who or what 
is exercising or exerting power, what resources, motives and 
interests are in the play, what is the limitations of power, what is its 
                                      
1 However, this widely used definition of Dahl was only one of his definitions. He 
also formulated a general description of power which covers interpersonal 
relations and relations among social collectivities. He writes: “At the most 
general level, power terms in modern social science refer to subsets of relations 
among social units such that the behaviours of one or more units ... depend in 
some circumstances on the behaviour of other units ...” (Dahl, 1986:40).  
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appearance and characteristics, how does it changes and how must 
it be evaluated. 
The following table lists these issues and some of the well-known 
writers who debated these issues: 
Table 1 
Who or what is exercising or exerting 
power 
Foucault, Galbraith, Giddens, 
Gramsci, Lenin, Lipset, Lukes, Mann, 
Marx, Mills, Morriss, Poulantzas, 
Russell, Simmel, Wrong 
What resources, motives and interests 
are in the play 
Arendt, Bachrach, Baratz, Dahl, 
Foucault, Freud, Galbraith, Giddens, 
Habermas, Hunter, Lenski, Lukes, 
Machiavelli, Morriss, Parsons, Simmel, 
Wrong  
What is the limitations of power Aron, Goldman, Lukes, Morriss, 
Parsons, Simmel  
What is its appearance and character-
istics 
Arendt, Dahl, De Jouvenel, Galbraith, 
Morriss, Parsons, Wrong  
How does it changes Lenski, Russell, Weber, Wrong 
How must it be evaluated Morriss 
Some of the debates, with regard to the issues listed in Table 1, also 
contributed towards the development of possible third generation 
definitions on power. These debates assisted in maturing the debate 
on the nature of the concept power.  
The nature of the power is important with regard to third generation 
definitions: the development of a third generation definition is not the 
same as the major conceptual progress from “power over” to “power 
to”, as we found in the first to the second generation definitions. The 
third generation definitions rather illustrate a more comprehensive 
defining of power especially with regard to related concepts like 
change and influence. But from current debates, it is clear that some 
other concepts are also important in these relationships. The follow-
ing sections address the nature of these relationships and contribute 
to the conclusion of this article which suggests a possible definition 
of power, accommodating these issues. 
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3. Power and change 
In different ways Morriss and Lukes raised indirectly the problematic 
relationship between power and change in their new books. 
However, Sartre has a formulation which most directly refer to this 
interesting relationship:  
In so far as man is immersed in the historical situation, he does 
not even succeed in conceiving of the failures and lacks in a 
political organization or determined economy; this is not, as is 
stupidly said, because he ‘is accustomed to it’, but because he 
apprehends it in its plenitude of being and because he can not 
even imagine that he can exist in it otherwise. For it is neces-
sary here to reverse common opinion and on the basis of what 
it is not, to acknowledge the harshness of a situation or the 
suffering which it imposes, both of which are motives for con-
ceiving of another state of affairs in which things would be bet-
ter for everybody. It is on the day that we can conceive of a 
different state of affairs that a new light falls on our troubles and 
our suffering and that we decide that these are unbearable. 
(Sartre, 1956:561.)  
Sartre is making the important point that only in a context where the 
possibility of change can be imagined, can power operate. 
To take Sartre’s view further, when, for some or other reason, 
change becomes impossible, the power relationship ends. If the 
ability to effect something (to bring about change) is not possible, 
power does not exist. This was confirmed in a research investigating 
the influence of leaders on change in a local community in South 
Africa (Zaaiman, 2001:374). In this research 32 local leaders were 
interviewed in October and November 2000. This was a few months 
after the new and final boundaries of the new local government of 
their community was stipulated by the demarcation board. In the 
discussion on the demarcation issue it soon became clear that the 
leaders no longer viewed it as a power issue. For them it became 
just a reality to live by. Before the demarcation most of them lobbied 
for alternative boundaries. They played a powerful role trying to 
influence the process. The moment it became clear that they could 
not influence the process anymore, they abandoned that initiative. 
Therefore it can be concluded that power exist only in a situation 
where the possibility of change is present. Power is aimed at change 
– to stop it, to start it or to direct it. This can only be done where the 
possibility of change exists. Power arises when change is possible. 
This is a necessary precondition for power to exist. But for power to 
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be exercised, agents are necessary. They are identified in the fol-
lowing section. 
4. Agents 
Agents cause an effect. A power agent or power (something with 
power) is therefore something that has the ability to cause an effect 
on affairs and people. It is customary to see people and groups as 
agents. In the debate on power other agents also have been 
identified. Some examples of that are discussed in this section.  
4.1 Agency in systems 
For Parsons power is a generalised capacity of units in a system to 
secure the performance of binding obligations. It holds for obliga-
tions that are legalised with reference to their bearing on collective 
goals. Further there is the presumption that in the case of recal-
citrance sanctions will be enforced if resistance is encountered. 
These sanctions are not enforced by a specific agency (Parsons, 
1986:103). Habermas formulates Parsons definition of power more 
plainly. He says that for Parsons, power is the generalised capacity 
of a social system to get things done on behalf of collective goals. 
Agreement produces the power that is fixed in binding decisions by 
the use of social resources (Habermas, 1986:76). Parsons view the 
social system as an agent exercising power.  
Giddens criticise Parsons’s definition as follows:  
In associating power with so-called ‘collective goals’, Parsons 
sacrifices part of the insight that the concept of power has no 
intrinsic relation to that of interest. If power has no logical con-
nection with the realization of sectional interests, neither does it 
have any with the realization of collective interests or ‘goals’. 
More substantively, Parsons’s concentration upon normative 
consensus as the foundation of the integration of societies 
leads him seriously to underestimate the significance of con-
testation of norms; and of the manifold circumstances in which 
force and violence, and the fear of them, are directly involved in 
the sanctioning of action. (Giddens, 1991:257.)  
Giddens therefore rejects Parsons argument in which he identifies 
the whole social system as an agent of power.  
But Foucault (1986) also viewed power not primarily forthcoming 
from individuals, but from the functioning of society. He says that 
rights (freedom clauses) is traditionally viewed as instruments to 
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temper power, but in reality these rights were instruments of do-
mination used to advance power (Foucault, 1986:229). The fact that 
rights are used in such a way and a truth is produced thereby to 
legitimise the power relationships, leads to the full domination of 
people – of their actions and their thoughts. Lukes put Foucault’s 
standpoint as follows: “People thus become subjects in a double 
sense: subject to others ‘by control and dependence’ and tied to 
their ‘own identity by consciousness and self-knowledge’.” (Lukes, 
1986:11.) Foucault stresses that the freedom of people are far-
reachingly limited by society. He says people are controlled from 
outside by a variety of power instruments, they are deprived of their 
independence and their identity is socially constructed (Lukes, 
1986:11). 
4.2 Agency in different dimensions 
Giddens is correct when he criticises a description making the agent 
of power too general. Foucault, on the other hand, correctly iden-
tifies aspects of society as agents of power. Lukes also refers to this 
in his description of, what he calls the three-dimensional perspective 
on power. 
Lukes integrates the different kinds of agents by referring to different 
dimensions of power. The first two dimensions he describes refer 
mainly to rulers and the third dimension to the role of social forces 
and institutions. Firstly he refers to the one-dimensional perspective 
on power:  
... this first, one-dimensional, view of power involves a focus on 
behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there 
is a conspicuous conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as ex-
press policy preferences, revealed by political participation 
(Lukes, 1974:15). 
He refers to the studies of Hunter and Dahl as examples in which 
the preferences of some agents rule over the preferences of others 
on key issues. The focus is here on the visible aspects of the power 
struggle. Secondly he refers to the two-dimensional perspective of 
power which was developed by Bachrach and Baratz (1963). He 
writes that this perspective of power:  
... allows for consideration of the ways in which decisions are 
prevented from being taken on potential issues over which 
there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as 
embodied in expressed policy preferences and sub-political 
grievances (Lukes, 1974:20).  
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All exercises of power do not occur conspicuously. Agents of power 
can determine which issues occur on the agenda and keep issues of 
their choice outside the decision-making level. Thirdly he writes on 
the three-dimensional perspective of power that he has developed 
himself. This perspective of power looks especially at the influence 
of social powers and institutions on the political decision-making 
level. Lukes writes that this perspective: “... allows for consideration 
of the many ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics, 
whether through the operation of social forces and institutional 
practices or individuals’ decisions” (Lukes, 1974:24). The decision-
making process is bedded in the social structure that has an 
important influence on what happens in the process. Social struc-
tures and institutions can therefore also be agents of power. 
4.3 Agency and interests 
Implied in Lukes description of the different dimensions of power is 
how difficult it is to answer the question: “Who can influence the 
interests of whom adversely?” Influence is complicated and there-
fore it is difficult to link it directly with interests. With humans as 
agents such links could be considered, but in the case of social 
structures it becomes even more difficult. The best is not to define 
power in view of the interests of agents.  
It is therefore clear that Poulantzas’s definition of power referring to 
the power as the ability of a social class to serve its specific in-
terests, is problematic (Pulantzas, 1986:144-155). Firstly interests 
problematise the definition and secondly Poulantzas excludes power 
as occurring on a personal level. He limits the meaning of power too 
much. Social classes can exert power. Power is a substantial part of 
stratification theories. Lenski formulated a more nuanced standpoint 
of power in terms of stratification, referring to the prejudices that 
arise from class and status distinctions. Lenski indicated that these 
prejudices become strongly institutionalised (Lukes, 1986:12). 
These prejudices exercise power!  
4.4 Conclusion on agency 
Power can be exercised by persons, groups, organisations or as-
pects of society. Foucault, Lukes, Poulantzas and Lenski each iden-
tified aspects of society as agents of power. The power of social 
constructs is clear from their arguments. Agents of power can there-
fore be humans but also non-humans. Power theories have different 
focuses. Some theories focus on power located at humans. There 
are also others that focus on the power exercised by organisations, 
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structures, traditions, languages, norms, identity and practises. To 
this can be added the power that natural phenomena can exercise 
with regard to society. Therefore in this article the following kinds of 
agents which can exercise power are identified: active, created and 
natural powers (power here means “something with power”). Active 
powers are powers who act on their interpretation of their situation 
and in view thereof exercise power. Examples of such powers are 
individuals, groups and the members of organisations. Created 
powers are powers created by people to exercise social control. Ex-
amples are patterns, structures, organisations as structures, tradi-
tions, languages, norms, values, identity, arrangements, processes 
and practices. Natural powers are powers that are brought about by 
nature. Examples are climate, natural resources and the natural 
needs of people. The definition of power proposed in this article, is 
formulated in such a way that it will apply to all of these powers. The 
following section discusses the controlling effect of power exercised 
by powers – a well-debated issue. 
5. Power and control  
The question whether power implies control, actually asks how the 
freedom of people can be limited. Power prevents them to advance 
their own freedom. The freedom of people can be limited in different 
ways for example: by interfering with the available choices for 
example by limiting them; by structuring the available choices in 
such a way that a certain choice would have a larger probability to 
be made than another; by manipulating the choices in such a way 
that those that are executable form a specific set; and by limiting 
subordinates the capacity to choose. The components of the mean-
ing of “freedom” are, however, just as complex as that of power. 
When and if an action is limiting, freedom and what coercion implies 
are controversial subjects. For instance, even within limiting mea-
sures, subordinates still keep the possibility to decide by themselves 
how they will react. Simmel (1986) also stresses this point with 
regard to power. The exercise of power to limit action cannot totally 
take away the subordinates’ freedom of action. It can only cause the 
cost of certain actions to look much more expensive (Lukes, 
1986:10). Morriss (1987:120) says:  
If we are interested in somebody’s freedom to do some spe-
cified thing, then making it costly or punishable to do it does not 
remove the power to do it, and so does not render someone un-
free to do it. 
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5.1 Control by limiting freedom 
Morriss adopted a standpoint between that of Simmel and the one of 
Foucault that implies little freedom in the power relationship. Morriss 
(1987:122) writes: “You are free to do something if there are no 
demeaning restraints on your power to do it; you lack freedom in so 
far as restraints which are inappropriate to your status are imposed 
on you.” On lack of freedom he writes:  
A summary of this section would be that to be unfree is to be 
unable, where the constraint on the ability is considered to be 
particularly demeaning to the actor’s self-respect: to say that 
one is unfree as well as unable is to imply that one is insulted 
as well as injured. (Morriss, 1987:119.) 
He observes the reason for the different views on freedom among 
writers as follows: “My claim is, then, that accounts of freedom differ 
because the various authors are working with different notions of 
self-respect.” (Morriss, 1987:118.) A man’s perspective on how his 
freedom is injured, will depend on the view of his own dignity. But 
dignity is only one human interest. An injury to his freedom limits a 
man’s capacity to promote his interests. The preceding is only a few 
remarks regarding the intense debate on how people’s abilities are 
limited. Power theorising ought to demonstrate the way and extent 
of the limits the exercise of power put on people’s choices. A 
common standpoint on this may be difficult to formulate because of 
the different premises on what freedom is. But the problem of con-
trollability is related to people’s capacity to interpret their situation 
and react on it. People interpret the exercise of power and act or 
react according to the outcome of the interpretation process. Dif-
ferent perspectives on this exist in the theorising on power. 
5.2 Control through the legitimisation of power 
Lenski holds the view that rulers overcome the possibility of the ne-
gative interpretation of their power by legitimising it. Power is a very 
effective medium to establish something, but an expensive medium 
in the sense that it can cause subordinates to become negative. 
Therefore, Lenski (1986:245) writes, “... those who seize power by 
force find it advantageous to legitimize their rule once effective 
organized opposition is eliminated”. The power of the conqueror is 
then legitimised and justified. This legitimising is usually done by 
means of laws (usually the laws of the old dispensation can be used, 
because they justified the old regime!), by instruments determining 
public opinion, for instance incentives and threats, educational and 
religious institutions and the mass media and by the fact that, be-
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cause of the daily demands, the ordinary man cannot be continuous-
ly politically active (Lenski, 1986:245-247). Institutionalised power 
differs from open power in the sense that it is much more socially 
acceptable and less personal (Lenski, 1986:249-250). 
5.3 Control and a common interpretation process 
Arendt overcomes the problem of the negative interpretation of the 
exercise of power by viewing power as the outcome of a common 
interpretation process. She views power not as an instrument that 
rulers use to attain a goal (Arendt, 1986:68), but for her power is a 
situation in which a group of people think and act over the use of 
means to realise a goal. Power is the ability to agree on a common 
way of acting within free communication. For Arendt power reveals 
itself in commands that ensure freedom, in resistance against forces 
that threatens political freedom and in those revolutionary actions 
that establish new institutions of freedom (Habermas, 1986:77). 
Power comes forward in free intersubjectivity. This power feeds 
institutions that defend the tender structures of intersubjectivity.  
Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted 
company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, 
where words are not used to violate and destroy, but to es-
tablish relations and create new realities. (Arendt as quoted in 
Habermas, 1986:79.) 
She (Arendt, 1986:68) also writes: “Power springs up whenever 
people get together and act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy 
from the initial getting together rather than from any action that then 
may follow.” Habermas is of the opinion that Arendt makes too much 
of the origin of power and too little of the use thereof. He is of the 
opinion that the gain of the standpoint of Arendt lies in her 
accentuation that rulers obtain their power from subordinates. 
Habermas adds the use of power to the origin of power. He stresses 
the importance that power is loaned by rulers:  
Power is a good for which political groups struggle and with 
which a political leadership manages things; but in a certain 
way both find this good already at hand; they don’t produce it. 
This is the impotence of the powerful – they have to borrow 
their power from the producers of power. This is the credo of 
Hannah Arendt. (Habermas, 1986:87.)  
Habermas also indicates a further weak point in Arendt’s argumen-
tation. He indicates that structural violence, that to a large extent 
entrenches itself, can unnoticeably limit and even block that commu-
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nication in which power is formed. Communication is not as free as 
Arendt has stated it in her standpoint (Habermas, 1986:88). Arendt 
also coupled the ruler and subordinate so closely together that it is 
scarcely possible to distinguish them from each other. 
5.4 Control through subordinates 
Wrong takes another viewpoint on the interpretation of power by the 
people involved. His ideas is only applicable to some kinds of power 
relationships, but it further illustrates the different views in the 
debate on the interpretation of power. Wrong accentuates two as-
pects of the power relationship. In his definition he emphasises that 
power let something really happens. Thus events can occur with or 
without the person with power actually doing something. Just the 
knowledge that the person with power can exercise power, can have 
effects on the subordinate, even if the person in power does not act 
actively. Secondly Wrong also emphasises the asymmetry of power 
and balance of power. Power does not only occur in the unequal 
relationship between the ruler and subordinate, but also where 
persons or groups have different powers over and against each 
other and control each other mutually. “Politics includes both a 
struggle for power and a struggle to limit, resist and escape from 
power.” (Wrong, 1979:13.) Power is only successful if the subor-
dinate joins in. Resistance let the power relationship fail. Wrong 
describes power therefore in view of the reaction of the subordinate. 
It is not necessary to define power in such a way. A definition of 
power must, however, accommodate the free interpretation process 
of the people being influenced. 
Aron describe this free interpretation process by writing that power 
can only be exercised over other people’s actions, not over them as 
persons. He therefore differ from Dahl’s formulation that A can have 
power over B. He prefers a clearer qualification of the meaning of 
“power over”. A can have power over the behaviour of B, but not 
over the person of B. He says: “It extends over certain men or cer-
tain groups, and not over others; it exercises command over certain 
kinds of behaviour by the objects of power, but not over others.” 
(Aron, 1986:260.) The subordinate also influences powers. In the 
exercise of power the process of influence is reciprocal. To illustrate 
this point Simmel for example refers to the reciprocal relationship 
that exists between the hypnotiser and the hypnotised (Simmel, 
1986:207). A human is never totally surrendered in a power relation-
ship. The subordinate is always free to determine its own reaction in 
a power relationship. The powers themselves are also influenced by 
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their exercise of power. Morriss illustrates this with the example of 
farmers who bargained for better food prices. Eventually they also 
had to pay more for food. The effect of their exercise of power 
rebounded on them (Morriss, 1987:115). Exchange theory gives 
special attention to this reciprocity of power relationships. To prevent 
resistance, rulers sometimes use power in such a way that the 
effects will be inconspicious.  
5.5 Conclusion on power and control 
People cannot be controlled directly – they always have freedom in 
their interpretation of the power relationship and to some extent 
what their reactive actions will be. To a large extent power depends 
on this interpretation of the subordinates of their situation. This must 
be accommodated in a definition of power. This interpretation on the 
exercise of power stems from an experience of being influenced. It 
is therefore important to have clarity on the relationship between 
power and influence. 
6. Power and influence 
Power and influence are two concepts closely related to each other. 
In defining power it must be distinguished from influence. Morriss 
(1987) thoroughly discusses the difference between influence and 
power. He gives certain meanings only to the concept influence and 
others only to power and says there are certain meanings these 
concepts share. According to him only the concept influence means: 
events are affected in a certain way; and deed of influence. Both the 
concepts influence and power mean: the ability to influence; and the 
person or thing that have influence or which influence others. Only 
the concept power means: control that is formally and publicly ex-
pressed as in legislation; and the ability to cause something in any 
manner.  
6.1 Affecting and influencing  
From this analysis Morriss concludes that power is not a thing (re-
sources), also not an event (practising of power), but an ability. 
Power is a dispositional concept. It is about the disposition of some-
one. Influence is a disposition with a continuing effect. Over against 
that, power is a disposition with a conditional effect. The person with 
power can practise power when so preferred.  
Morriss further says that influence is related to influencing and po-
wer to affecting. When influencing occurs without affecting some-
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thing, power was not practised. On the other hand, to affect some-
thing without influencing is the practise of power. Morriss therefore 
argues strongly for the use of the expression “power to” rather than 
“power over”. He says for example that when we say: “He has power 
over (in connection with) the matter whether it is going to rain or not” 
we are actually speaking of influencing. If, however, we say: “He has 
power to produce rain” we speak of producing effects and that is 
true power (Morriss, 1987:33). Morriss indicates that the use of 
“power over” usually has the intention to refer to ability of the person 
in power to achieve his goals through the influencing of the sub-
ordinate. But actually “power over” refers that the goal of the person 
in power is to rule over the subordinate and to regulate his be-
haviour over a broad front. The expression “power over” actually 
only expresses the influencing aspect of the concept power and that 
is not a necessary part of the meaning of the concept. “Power to” is 
rather related to the core meaning of power – with the ability to 
affect something (Morriss, 1987:33). 
6.2 Power causes effects 
Power is not one-directional, but it activates reaction. Sartre says: 
“While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other 
is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, 
the Other seeks to enslave me.” (Sartre, 1956:475.) This reaction is 
not always clear. The influence of power can be recognised or mis-
recognised (for example in symbolic violence or habitus as ex-
plained by Bourdieu). Lukes (2005:122) explain it as follows:  
In all these various ways, domination can induce and sustain 
internal constraints upon self-determination – ways of under-
mining and distorting people’s confidence in and sense of self 
and of misleading and subverting their judgment as to how best 
to advance their interests. … But that is to view social actors as 
simply the bearers of social roles, identifying their interests with 
the requirements of their roles. 
Interpersonal power is much easier to qualify and therefore to resist, 
than impersonal power (Lukes: “third-dimensional power”). But 
influence is not about the overcoming of resistance (see discussion 
of Morriss, 2002:xxxii-xxxv). The formation of preferences, inter-
nalisation and hegemony are all influences in a certain way which 
cause effects – influence up to the virtuous resignation of Nietsche’s 
slaves (Lukes, 2005:132). Power can be at work, inducing com-
pliance by influencing desires and beliefs, without being “intelligent 
and intentional” (Lukes, 2005:136). Power influence to cause ef-
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fects. Power is the ability to have an effect. But what effect? Diverse 
opinions exist with regard to it. In the following section some of 
these perspectives are discussed. 
7. Power and the ability to affect  
A great deal of the debate over the definition of power deals with the 
effect of the exercise of power. In the early definitions the effect was 
related to the will of the ruler. In the course of time this issue was 
debated in depth. 
7.1 Power produces effects 
Goldman defined power in view of the effect it creates, as follows: “S 
has power with respect to issue E if and only (a) if S wanted 
outcome e, then e would occur, and (b) if S wanted outcome not-e, 
then not-e would occur.” (Goldman, 1986:159.) Russell also writes 
that power is in its core the production of intended effects on other 
people (Russell, 1986:19). Lukes reckon that power is more about 
the ability to produce effects than the production of effects them-
selves. According to him it is often not clear which effects were 
produced by power and which not (Lukes, 1986:1).  
Wrong proposes a definition of power in which he tries to reconcile 
Russell’s definition with that of Dahl. Wrong describes power as the 
ability of some persons to bring about intended and anticipated 
effects on others (Wrong, 1979:2). Thereby Wrong limits his defini-
tion to intended and anticipated influencing. He admits, however, 
that power nearly always have unintended and non-anticipated 
influencing as a result. He does not include this type of influencing in 
his definition, because, he states:  
Power would be collapsed into social control and would include 
the diffuse control of the One by the Many as well as the 
relatively permanent past effects of power embodied in inter-
nalized norms (the superego), taken-for-granted beliefs and 
even language itself which, as contemporary linguistic philo-
sophers have shown, contains built-in preconceptions, prejudg-
ments and evaluations. (Wrong, 1979:252.)  
However, he (Wrong, 1979:253) further writes: “Nevertheless, one 
can and should recognise that power is inherent in all social inter-
action, which consists of actors reciprocally producing effects on one 
another.” Thus whilst Wrong senses that power is also related to 
unforeseen and unintended influencing, he is not prepared to ac-
commodate it in his definition. The contribution of Wrong lies in his 
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extension of the definition of power to emphasise on the capacity of 
people to bring about effects. He, however, hesitates before the 
problem of unforeseen and unintended influencing and doesn’t give 
it a place in his definition. He also sees the production of effects only 
as the change of behaviour while it can also imply changes in 
opinions or beliefs. 
7.2 Power as the ability to affect 
Giddens (1991), in his preference to speak of “power to” rather than 
“power over”, formulated power as an agent with the ability to make 
a difference in the present state of affairs. Giddens pointed out that 
power is often viewed as stemming from the will of a person and that 
it is related to achieving wanted and intended outcomes. He pointed 
out that Parsons and Foucault view power as the property of a 
society or social community. Giddens infered that both these views 
on power are correct. Giddens was of the opinion that both these 
views can be joined by referring to resources. He (Giddens, 
1991:15) said:  
Resources (focused via signification and legitimation) are struc-
tured properties of social systems, drawn upon and reproduced 
by knowledgeable agents in the course of interaction.  
He adds: “Resources are media through which power is exercised, 
as a routine element of the instantiation of conduct in social repro-
duction.” (Giddens, 1991:16.) Giddens concludes that resources are 
embedded in the structure of society and that agents use these 
resources ingeniously to make a difference in the social course of 
events. 
Giddens was against the identification of power only with conflict (as 
in Marxism) or only with domination (as in liberalism). He wrote:  
Power is not necessarily linked with conflict in the sense of 
either division of interest or active struggle, and power is not 
inherently oppressive. ... Power is the capacity to achieve out-
comes; whether or not these are connected to purely sectional 
interests is not germane to its definition. Power is not, as such, 
an obstacle to freedom or emancipation but is their very me-
dium – although it would be foolish, of course, to ignore its 
constraining properties. The existence of power presumes 
structures of domination whereby power that ‘flows smoothly’ in 
processes of social reproduction (and is, as it were, ‘unseen’) 
operates. The development of force or its threat is thus not the 
type case of the use of power. (Giddens, 1991:257.)  
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Giddens’s definition of power expressed the dynamics of the exer-
cising of power. His opinion, that it is about making a difference in 
the course of events, expressed a variety of the dynamic aspects of 
the exercising of power. Giddens, however, did not escape critique 
with the formulation he used. It is not clear in his formulation how the 
effects that is not produced by the exercising of power, must be 
distinguished from those which was produced by the exercising of 
power. Power implies the production of effects, but what type of 
effects? 
7.3 Conclusion on power and the ability to affect 
It is clear from the debate on the effects of power that it illustrates 
the incidence of power. Therefore the identification of effects is im-
portant in the defining of power. This problem is addressed in the 
proposed definition by distinguishing between influence and effect. 
Power has been exercised when both influence and effect have 
been realised. The effect, however, can only be accomplished 
through influence. The influence is directed at the actions and 
opinions of people with the goal to accomplish effects. These effects 
imply impacting on affairs and people. In the next section the 
insights of the preceding discussion is used to define power.  
8. Power defined  
In view of the previous discussion the following conclusions can be 
drawn:  
• Power is about having an ability to accomplish an effect. The 
reference to effect is important to distinguish power clearly from 
the concept influence.  
• Power can be exercised by different kinds of powers: active, 
created or natural. Active powers can for instance exercise power 
by means of their interpretation of a situation. Created powers are 
structures, patterns, processes, institutions, et cetera created by 
people to structure human life. In this structuring process the 
powers created by humans impact on human life. Natural powers 
like climate, needs and natural resources also affect humans. 
Power exists in many forms and must be defined according to 
that. 
• Power is an ability. It is the capability to do something. It refers to 
a capacity the holder of power has. The proof of the power lies in 
the exercise of it, but it can also exist only by means of per-
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ceptions. The ability is in the first instance to influence people. It 
is a capacity to direct the actions and opinions of people. 
• Power cannot intrude the freedom of people to interpret the exer-
cise of power. People’s reactions to the exercise of power can 
never be totally determined. Potentially humans always have the 
capacity to react according to their own views. The exercise of 
power is at the mercy of the reaction of those who are influenced 
with the aim to be affected.  
• The influence exercised by power can only be on humans. Affairs 
cannot be affected directly. It must be done through firstly influ-
encing humans who construct the ideas of affairs. 
• Primarily power is about causing effects. Through influencing the 
goal of power is to affect affairs and people. Affairs refer to social 
constructs. Different aspects of people can be affected – actions, 
perceptions, thoughts, practices, beliefs, et cetera. This effect can 
be to stop change, start change or direct it.  
In view of this, the proposed definition defines power firstly as an 
ability to influence. This ability arises from a possible situation of 
change that makes it possible for outcomes to occur. The influence 
is on people’s actions and opinions. This means that people are free 
to interpret this influence which determines their reaction to the 
influence. Eventually power is also an ability to affect affairs and 
people, but it is mediated by the process of influence and reaction. 
The outcome of power is therefore not the result of the exercise of 
power, but the result of the reciprocal relationship between the 
power and the people under its influence. Therefore the definition 
proposed for power in this article is: Power is the ability, in view of 
the possibility of change, to influence the actions and opinions of 
people and so causes effects in affairs and people.  
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